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Android Application Security 
Scanning Process
Iman Almomani and Mamdouh Alenezi
Abstract
This chapter presents the security scanning process for Android applications. 
The aim is to guide researchers and developers to the core phases/steps required to 
analyze Android applications, check their trustworthiness, and protect Android 
users and their devices from being victims to different malware attacks. The 
scanning process is comprehensive, explaining the main phases and how they are 
conducted including (a) the download of the apps themselves; (b) Android applica-
tion package (APK) reverse engineering; (c) app feature extraction, considering 
both static and dynamic analysis; (d) dataset creation and/or utilization; and  
(e) data analysis and data mining that result in producing detection systems, classi-
fication systems, and ranking systems. Furthermore, this chapter highlights the app 
features, evaluation metrics, mechanisms and tools, and datasets that are frequently 
used during the app’s security scanning process.
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1. Introduction
This section introduces the Android operation system and its applications. 
Moreover, it defines Android malware and shares its recent statistics. Android 
permissions and security model are also presented. This section ends with discuss-
ing the security scanning framework for Android applications.
1.1 Android and application definition
Android is one of the most popular operating systems that provide open-source 
development environment based on Linux. It allows the development for mobile, 
tablets, smartwatches, and smart TVs. Android was established by Open Handset 
Alliance that started working in 2003, while Google released its first Software 
Development Kit (SDK) in 2007, but the first commercial version was released in 
September 2008 called as Android 1.0 [1] with the first device executed being HTC 
Dream. The sale of the Android phone was increased from 75% in 2013 [2] to 88% 
in 2018 [3]. Table 1 lists the sales of smartphones from 2011 to 2018 which show 
a clear capture of the market over the years. This market penetration reveals the 
successful implementation of features as well as cheap price.
The Android system is composed of five important layers:
• Applications refer to the software stack of native as well as user-based 
applications.
Telecommunication Systems – Principles and Applications of Wireless-Optical Technologies
2
• Android runtime allows the application to run on mobile devices by convert-
ing the Android code into DEX format or byte code. The conversion of DEX 
code into device-related code is done before compilation, and this kind of 
technique is referred to as ahead of time (AOT).
• Application framework manages and runs the applications using the services 
such as activity manager, content providers, telephony manager, package 
manager, location manager, etc.
• Android libraries are a set of Java-based development application program-
ming interfaces (APIs) that can help in performing general purpose tasks, as 
well as location-based and string handling.
• Android kernel is based on the Linux 2.6 kernel and is used to provide abstrac-
tion between device hardware and other software layers [4, 5].
The efforts for making each of the component secure have been made. However, 
still there are issues due to open-source development, and every vendor and com-
pany following their own standards has led to serious security issues [6].
The Android application contains four types of components shown in Figure 1 [7]:
• Activities: each activity represents a single screen with a user interface.
• Services: a service operates in the background to execute long-running 
operations. Services could be initiated by other components like activity or 
broadcast receiver.
• Content providers: to share data between different applications.
• Broadcast receivers: to listen for specific system-wide broadcast announce-
ments and react to them.
Android applications are written in Java programming language and distributed 
as .apk files. Android application package (APK) file is a ZIP compressed file that 
includes the following files:
• AndroidManifest.xml file: it describes the application’s capabilities and 
informs the OS about the other components of the application. It identifies the 
needed hardware and software features such as the camera, in addition to, the 
minimum API level required by the application. The permissions requested by 
the app and the permissions required to access the application’s interfaces/data 
are defined in its manifest file.
• Dalvik executable or classes.dex file: the Java classes and methods defined in 
the application code are grouped into one single file (classes.dex).
• .xml files: which are used to define the user interface of the application.
• Resources: the external resources that are associated with the application (e.g., 
images).
Android applications run in a virtual environment to improve security. However, 
they can be downloaded from any source whether trusted or not. After an applica-
tion is initiated, it grants its own virtual environment, so the code will be isolated 
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from other apps. Although the applications are isolated, still they can interact with 
the system and other applications through APIs. Meanwhile, Android assigns Linux 
user ID for each application.
API stands for application programming interface that refers to the set of tools 
providing interfaces for communication between different software components. APIs 
are used to access data and key features within Android devices. API framework con-
sists of a set of API packages that include specific classes and methods. Additionally, it 
contains a set of XML elements and attributes for declaring a manifest file and access-
ing resources besides permissions and intents. Looking into API component calls in the 
executable file may allow exploring the behavior of an app and reporting its capabili-
ties. However, in many cases, the attackers hide the API calls using cryptography, 
reflection, or dynamic code loading techniques to increase the difficulty of analysis.
1.2 Malware definition and statistics
Presently, mobile device apps are distributed through online marketplaces such 
as Google Play Store. Such marketplaces are considered hubs to allow developers 
Figure 1. 
The Android application components.
Year Android share iOS shares Other OS shares
2011 46.66 18.87 34.45
2012 66.34 19.11 14.53
2013 78.50 15.54 5.94
2014 80.70 15.37 3.91
2015 81.60 15.88 2.50
2016 84.79 14.44 0.75
2017 85.91 13.98 0.09
2018 88 11.75 0.03
Table 1. 
The detail of the Android phone compared to iOS and other smartphone sales shares from 2011 to 2018 retrieved 
from Statista.com [3].
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to publish their apps and distribute them as well. Today, there are more than 2.5 
million applications available in the Google Play Store [8].
When downloading apps from unofficial markets, the user is usually at risk 
because there is no centralized control like official markets. As more users shift to 
Android devices, cybercriminals are also turning to Android to inflate their gain. 
However, many Android apps turn out to be malicious. The number of malicious 
software (malware) samples in the Android market has surged to an alarming 
number reaching over 5.49 million by the end of 2018 [9, 10].
A recent report from F-Secure [11] showed that over 99% of all malware pro-
grams that target mobile devices are designed for Android devices. Another report 
from the security firm G DATA shows that a new instance of Android malware 
pops up nearly every 10 seconds. Another report from AV-TEST [12] states very 
clearly that anyone seeking to make money by attacking mobile devices will choose 
Android devices as targets.
Malware is an umbrella term used to stand for an assortment of types of hos-
tile or intrusive software, including viruses, worms, Trojan horses, ransomware, 
spyware, adware, and different malicious programs [13].
Ransomware is considered one of the most threating malwares nowadays. 
There are two types of ransomware: crypto ransomware and lock screen ransom-
ware. The crypto ransomware encrypts the information, while the locker ransom-
ware hinders users from gaining access to their data by locking the device’s screen. 
For both types, the attack demands a payment (ransom) to recover the files or 
access to the device. It is worth mentioning that paying the ransom money does not 
guarantee that the files will be back or that the ransomware will be removed from 
the device [14, 15].
According to Kaspersky, ransomware has taken place in most of the majority of 
notorious security attacks for the past decade. Also, 116.5 million attacks were noted 
in 2018, compared to 66.4 million in 2017, an increase of twofold in just 1 year [16].
Malicious apps, in general, are distributed mostly through phishing, drive-by 
attacks, and app stores. Phishing messages might comprise links to malicious apps 
and are sent over SMS or WhatsApp. Drive-by attacks are carried out by Web page 
exploits. When the user has a vulnerable browser, the exploit is able to execute a 
code. To infect users through app stores, malwares are submitted to them hiding 
as some legitimate app. In fact, in some cases some popular apps are modified to 
include malicious actions while keeping the app’s main functionalities [17].
Therefore, a reliable tool is needed to test the trustworthiness of these apps 
before being installed. App risk scoring or rating should be empirically calculated 
according to different risk scoring techniques. The visualization of these risks 
should be easy enough for a normal user to recognize the risk associated with a 
specific app.
1.3 Android permissions and security model
Android platform is very popular due to its available and comprehensive API 
framework [18]. Android API offers the developers of mobile apps the ability to 
gain access to hardware information, accessing user’s data, knowing phone state, 
changing phone settings, etc. The developers are impacted by the permission model 
while developing mobile applications. To develop a mobile app, the engineers are 
required to determine, for each API functionality, what permissions are needed and 
how they are correctly activated. Android asks the developers to list publicly what 
permissions are used by the app; however, there are no mechanisms to know the 
exact purpose of such permissions and what kind of sensitive data they could use.
Android permissions mainly fall under four categories [19]:
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• Normal: minimal risk permission is assigned automatically by the system and 
does not require an explicit declaration.
• Dangerous: the permission to private data, system process, and other hard-
ware is referred to as dangerous and should be assigned explicitly at the time of 
installation or usage of the application.
• Signature: the applications get the same ID and the same access rights if the 
two application certificates are the same.
• SignatureOrSystem: the applications that are signed with the same certificate 
will get the same permission as the base system automatically.
Take the camera permission as an example; it belongs to the dangerous category. 
These permissions also ensure the safety of the system by keeping the user aware of 
what he is trying to do and what permissions have been requested. The issue with 
Android permission is that they are coarse-grained and violate the principle of least 
privileges (PoLP) that ensure that the only required thing is permitted. In contrast, 
Android allows overall permission about most of the features such as phone contact 
permission can allow checking phone state and other details.
The Android permission system obliges app’s developers to state which security 
critical resources are needed. At runtime, the access requests are controlled by 
the permission checker component in order to secure the critical resources and 
operations.
In general, the security policy for the phones is delegated to their users. The 
lists of permissions will be shown to the users where they can accept or reject. It is 
essential and challenging to make sure that these apps appropriately deal with great 
value sensitive data [18].
Since Android 6.0, dangerous permissions are now asked explicitly to the user 
when requested the first time and then granted automatically. Android 6.0 changed 
some areas with regard to permissions. Two major changes were introduced.  
(1) Apps targeting SDK 23 (Software Development Kit) or higher can request 
permissions at run-time. (2) If an app requests a dangerous permission, with 
another permission from the same group that has been already granted, the system 
immediately grants it without any further interaction with the user.
The Android permission system received several criticisms [20]. The system is 
considered to be too coarse-grained since the user has to choose whether to accept 
all of the permissions declared by an app or to refuse to install the app. Users are 
usually not sure to determine if an app can be trusted or not. Actually, how Android 
is showing the required permissions is not very user-friendly and quite difficult to 
understand the risks associated with these permissions.
Android apps are allowed to define new custom permissions on Android. These 
permissions are used to protect an app’s own resources from others. To define new 
custom permission, a permission name is needed, optionally including a permission 
group and a description regarding the permission purpose. Sixty-five percent of 
Google Play Store apps define their custom permissions, whereas 70% of these apps 
request them for their operation [21].
Mobile app history has shown that the users’ privacy and security must be 
protected against benign applications not to mention malware ones. Actually, lots of 
widely used apps have been reported as requiring too many permissions or leaking 
user information to their servers intentionally [22].
Android uses both discretionary access control (DAC) and mandatory access 
control (MAC) to form a multilayer security model [23]. The model implements a 
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kernel-level application sandbox that uses Linux user identifiers (UIDs) and UNIX-
style file permissions. Since version 4.3, Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) was 
introduced, and from version 4.4 it started being deployed in enforcing mode.
Android security has seen other improvements as well. In version 5.0, Google 
introduced smart lock, which allows users to unlock the phone using a trusted 
device, such as Bluetooth/NFC beacon, smartwatch, or facial recognition. In ver-
sion 6.0, they introduced a fingerprint API. All these features are an extra step to 
make security easier for the average user. However, Android’s security model is still 
based on a set of coarse-grained permissions.
Android builds its security basis on multiuser capabilities of Linux by assigning 
a unique ID to each application that will manage its own processes [24]. The run-
time manager runs the applications in its sandbox that provides security as it does 
not allow:
• Inter-process communication
• Data access to other processes
• Hardware access such as camera, GPS, or network
• Access to local data of the phone such as media libraries and contacts
As a contrast to other OS platforms, the sandbox facility is provided by runtime 
manager for direct access to resources and hardware, while other operating systems 
provide sandboxing based on their kernel. This is based on features such as all kinds 
of requests outside the applications are by default denied and have to be permitted 
explicitly. When an application is installed, the permissions are allocated in addition 
to a unique, permanent identification (ID) that is also assigned to this app. This 
application ID is used to enforce the permissions for application, processes, and file 
system [25–27].
The files in the application are always private unless they are explicitly set 
to be shared using two modes, (1) readable and (2) writable. In order for two 
applications to share other’s files, then the application ID must be the same for 
both applications, as well as the user ID. Additionally the public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) certificate value must be shared to be considered as one application 
[27]. The paranoid network security mechanism is used to protect the network 
access by keeping all kinds of network access in separate groups such as WiFi, the 
Internet, and Bluetooth. Thus, if the application or process gets the permission to 
access a Bluetooth, then its application ID will be added to the group access list for 
Bluetooth and similarly for others. Consequently, one application can be assigned 
to one or more access groups [28].
Before any application distribution, Google that manages the main play store 
requires to sign the application using developers’ personal certificate to make sure 
that the distributed copy is done through the right developer and no modification 
can be made to the application. If the two application matches the same certificate, 
Android will assign the same application ID to both applications and will access to 
private files for each application [27, 28].
Relying only on the current Android security model and permission levels to 
secure Android app is inefficient. Other more comprehensive security systems need 
to be considered and implemented to ensure efficient detection of malware apps. 
Consequently, the following sections present a reference model for Android appli-
cation’s security scanning process.
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1.4 Android application scanning framework
A reference model for Android scanning process is shown in Figure 2. This 
model provides the core steps/phases vital to analyze Android apps and malware 
detection. The following sections highlight each one of these phases, starting from 
allocating the source of Android apps, downloading mechanisms, app’s source code 
generation process, app’s features extraction, applying static and dynamic analysis, 
generating datasets, detecting and classifying the app into benign or malware, and 
ranking its risk if it is detected as a malware app. Moreover, the mostly used mecha-
nisms and tools utilized by researchers and developers at each process’s phase are 
also presented.
Figure 2. 
Android application security scanning model [29].
Telecommunication Systems – Principles and Applications of Wireless-Optical Technologies
8
2. Android application
The app’s source and how they are downloaded are presented in this section, in 
addition to the source code generation for Android applications.
2.1 App source and download
Android application collection process includes gathering APK files from 
different Android marketplaces. The main application sources include Google 
Play, Anzhi, and AppChina. For every potential free app, the crawler script must 
ensure that the app has not been downloaded before and then calculate the app’s 
hash using the SHA256 algorithm [30]. Once the app is downloaded, it can be 
archived for future use. Chrome APK Downloader, a desktop version of APK 
downloader tool, can be used to download the APK files of the free Android appli-
cations into desktop from Google Play marketplace [31]. For the paid applications, 
the Raccoon APK Downloader can be used to download APK files from Google 
Play Store [32].
2.2 Source code generation
After downloading the apps, they need to be analyzed. In order to do that, APK 
reverse engineering process is required to decompile, rebuild, and convert the 
Android executable code (.apk file) into an intermediate language such as Smali, 
Jimple, and Jasmin [33]. The aim of reverse engineering is to retrieve the source 
file from the executable files in order to apply program analysis. Unzipping the 
APK files generates .dex files. By reassembling the dex files using an APK reverse 
engineering tool, the Java files can be retrieved. Three of the most popular tools 
that have been used in Android APK reverse engineering are Apktool, Dex2jar, and 
Soot. A comparison of Android reverse engineering tools was conducted in [33]. 
The results showed that Apktool which uses Smali reassembled 97% of the original 
code, whereas Soot which uses Jimple and Dex2jar which uses Jasmin preserve 73% 
and 69% of the app’s original code, respectively.
3. Android application analysis
The process of analyzing Android apps to detect different types of malwares and 
the result of such analysis in terms of datasets are illustrated in this section.
3.1 Feature extraction
Once the app’s source code is retrieved, the feature extraction process starts. The 
features that are usually extracted depend on the type of malware and the analysis 
mode whether static or dynamic. This will be explained in the following two sub-
sections. Table 2 lists the most commonly used static and dynamic features [34].
3.2 Static analysis
The static analysis aims to check the existence of malware by disassembling the 
source code without executing the application. Tools which perform static analysis 
are mainly categorized into three approaches as shown in Figure 3: (1) signature-
based detection, (2) permission-based detection, and (3) Dalvik Bytecode detec-
tion. There is some limitation which is related to each static detection approach. The 
9Android Application Security Scanning Process
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.86661
signature-based detection which relies on stored signatures for known malwares 
does not have the ability to detect unidentified malware signatures [35]. In the 
permission-based detection, the benign app could be considered, incorrectly, as a 
malware due to the minor variation of the requested permissions from the original 
and the malware application [30]. Finally, the Dalvik Bytecode detection, which 
assists in evaluating the applications actions, consumes more resources [36]. Several 
tools were discussed and analyzed in [35–41] such as FlowDroid [39], PScout [40], 
and ApkAnalyser [41]. Each of the aforementioned tools focuses on one or more 
features. The most generally extracted static features are the permissions [18], API 
calls [42], and source code metrics [43].
Years ago, different rival static approaches have been proposed like TaintDroid 
[43], DroidRanger [45], and RiskRanker [46] to detect malicious malware features. 
But all of them rely on manually crafted detection patterns which may not be able to 
detect new malware and come with significant device performance cost [47].
Authors in [48] proposed DREBIN as the first approach which provides 
detection of Android malicious code directly on the mobile device. They used 
Static features Dynamic features
Permission Network, SMS, power usage, CPU, process info, native and Dalvik memory
API calls Data packets being sent, IP address, no. of active communications, system calls
String extracted Process ID, system calls collected by strace, returned values, times between 
consecutive calls
Native commands Network traffic, destination IP address
XML elements System calls collected by strace, logs of system activities
Meta data Data collected by logger, Internet traffic, battery percentage, temperature collected 
every minute
Opcodes from .dex 
file
Task intents
Table 2. 
Most commonly used features in static and dynamic analyses [34].
Figure 3. 
Existing malware detection techniques.
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static analysis in a machine learning system to distinguish malware from trusted 
applications. They considered linear support vector machines for classification. 
This approach, however, cannot detect runtime loaded and obfuscated malicious 
applications because it relies on static analysis [47].
Yang [49] developed a prototype (AppContext) that detects malicious apps 
using static analysis. They mined 633 benign apps from Google Play and 202 
malware apps from various malware datasets. AppContext identifies applications 
using machine learning based on the contexts that trigger security-sensitive behav-
iors (e.g., the conditions and events that cause the security-sensitive behaviors to 
occur). But this approach can be evaded by dynamic code loading and consumes 
huge human efforts in labeling each security-sensitive behavior [50].
Akhuseyinoglu and Akhuseyinoglu [51] have proposed an automated feature-
based static malware detection system called AntiWare for Android devices. It is 
automated since it engages the machine learning method for detecting malicious 
applications by using the extracted apps’ features. They took into consideration the 
requested permissions and Google market data, including developer name, down-
load time, and user ratings from Google Play as a feature set. AntiWare is designed 
to predict the rank of an application inquired by the user as malicious or benign and 
then report the results to the user. The main disadvantages are primarily depending 
on market data on Google Play and the requested permissions. The market data 
is not reliable since a lot of applications are invented by different new developers 
every second. Additionally, the permissions by its own are not sufficient to assess 
the malicious behavior of an application.
3.3 Dynamic analysis
In dynamic analysis, the application actions are dynamically analyzed and 
monitored during the execution time. The unexecuted code might be missed by this 
approach, but it can effectively detect the malware behaviors which are not detect-
able by the static analysis. Since this approach occurs during runtime, it can be 
performed in a controlled environment to avoid damaging the device [52].
Android dynamic malware analysis detection techniques (see Figure 3) can be 
classified into [53, 54]:
• Anomaly detection: the anomaly-based detection has the ability to identify 
suspicious behaviors to indicate the presence of malware. A drawback for this 
technique is that it can sometimes flag a benign application as malware because 
it displayed similar behaviors of malware.
• Taint analysis: it is an efficient technique that checks and monitors sensitive 
information; however, a limitation is that the performance becomes very slow 
rendering it useless to be applied in real time.
• Emulation-based detection: it is a detection technique, where it scans the 
application behavior by simulating the conditions of its execution environment 
to determine if the application is a benign or malware application from the 
behavior. Similar to this technique is sandbox-based detection, but the main 
difference originates from the details of designing each approach. A major 
drawback for this approach is that it requires more resources.
Tam [55] applied dynamic analysis method and machine language to detect 
malware. They capture real-time system calls performed by the application as key 
information to discriminate between ransomware, malware, and trusted files and 
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called it CopperDroid. CopperDroid runs the Android application in the sandbox 
and records all system calls, in particular inter-process communications (IPC) and 
remote procedure call (RPC) interactions which are essential to understanding an 
application maliciousness behavior. However, some types of malware can detect the 
virtual environment and act differently (as a benign) which gives false positives.
Recent research [56] dynamically classifies Android applications to malicious or 
benign in the first launching of the app. The classification is applied based on the fre-
quency of system calls as an indicator of suspicious behavior. They have built a syscall-
capture system to capture and analyze the behavior of system call traces made by each 
application during their runtime. They have achieved an accuracy level of 85% and 
88% using the decision tree algorithm and the random forest algorithm, respectively.
Also, Wang [57] proposed a dynamic analysis to analyze an application on the fly 
to detect malicious behavior. They developed a prototype called Droid-AntiRM to 
identify malware applications that employ anti-analysis techniques. The prototype 
identifies the condition statements in applications that could trigger the malicious 
acts of malware, which are unable to be recognized by static analysis. However, 
their prototype cannot handle dynamic code loading, encryption, or other various 
obfuscation techniques.
Many tools have been developed based on the dynamic perspective such as 
TaintDroid [44], Droidbox [58], and MobSF [59]. Additionally, some tools are consid-
ering both static and dynamic analysis in their solutions such as VirusTotal tool [60].
3.4 Ransomware detection
Unfortunately, there were very few researches studying ransomware where the 
malicious app blocks access to the Android device or/and its data. In [61] the authors 
presented a tool called Cryptolock that focuses on detecting ransomware by tracking 
the changes in real-time user data. They have implemented the tool on Windows 
platform. However, Cryptolock may send a false-positive alert because it cannot 
differentiate whether the user or the ransomware is encrypting a set of files [62]. 
They focus on changes on user’s data rather than trying to discover ransomware by 
investigating its execution (e.g., API call monitoring and access permissions).
HelDroid tool [63] was developed to analyze Android ransomware and to detect 
both crypto and locking ransomwares. The tool includes a text classifier that uses 
natural language processing (NLP) features, a lightweight Smali emulation technique 
to detect the locking scheme, and the application of taint tracking for detecting file-
encrypting flows. The primary disadvantage of this approach is that it highly depends 
on a text classifier as it assumes the availability of text. Also, it cannot be applied 
to some languages that have no specific phase structure like Chinese, Korean, and 
Japanese. This approach can be easily avoided by ransomware by applying techniques 
such as encryption and code obfuscation [63]. Moreover, like whatever machine 
learning approach, HelDroid trains the classifier in order to label an app as a ransom-
ware. The detection capability of the model depends on the training dataset [64–66].
Another work in literature exploring the ransomware detection in Android 
mobiles was presented in [67]. The authors presented R-PackDroid as a static 
analysis approach that classifies Android applications into ransomware, malware, 
or benign using random forest classifier. The classification employed was based on 
information taken from the system API packages. An advantage over the previous 
approach (HelDroid) is its ability to detect ransomware regardless of the applica-
tion language. Also, it flags the applications that were recognized as ransomware 
with very low confidence by the VirusTotal service. However, R-PackDroid cannot 
analyze applications with a feature code that is dynamically loaded at runtime or 
classes that are fully encrypted because it relies on static analysis.
Telecommunication Systems – Principles and Applications of Wireless-Optical Technologies
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Likewise, Mercaldo [68] focused on ransomware detection specifically in 
Android. They tested a dataset composed of 2477 samples with real-world ran-
somware and benign applications. The main issue of this approach is that it is 
manual and requires a lot of effort to analyze and build logic rules used for the 
classification [69].
Another automated detection approach was introduced in [70] to analyze and 
penetrate the malicious ransomware. They have introduced some features of static 
and dynamic analysis of malware. In static analysis, malicious features can be dis-
covered with permissions, API calls, and APK structure, while malicious features in 
the dynamic analysis may include access to sensitive data or sensitive paths, access 
to the HTTP server, and user charge without notification and bypass permissions. 
The aim was to produce a better performance apparatus that supports ransomware 
detection in Android mobiles which they have designed but did not implement. 
The authors analyzed one malware and listed the steps of APK analysis as a concept 
but did not implement the proposed design. Therefore, there are no results that can 
prove the effectiveness of their approach.
In [71], the authors experimentally presented a new framework called 
DNADroid which is a hybrid of static and dynamic techniques. This framework 
employs a static analysis approach to classify apps into suspicious, malware, or 
trusted. Only suspicious classified applications are then inspected by dynamic 
analysis to determine if it is ransomware or not. The main weakness is that dynamic 
analysis is only applied to suspicious applications leaving the possibility of having 
malware not successfully recognized by static analysis.
3.5 Dataset creation and utilization
Datasets are mainly in two types. The first type is the Android application 
datasets. These include both benign apps and malicious apps. For the benign apps, 
the majority of researchers are collecting them from the app stores like Google 
Play Store [30, 37, 60]. For malicious apps, it depends on malicious behavior under 
study. For example, for malware Android apps, VirusTotal was one of the main 
sources for many researchers [38, 60]. For ransomware apps, HelDroid project [63] 
and RansomProper project [38] were also used.
The second type is the datasets generated after extracting the app’s features. The 
researchers can either use existing constructed datasets considering the features 
under study or build new ones by screening the apps and extracting their features. 
The main concerns regarding the use of existed datasets are (1) absence of up-to-
date apps and operating system version (2) including many duplicate samples  
(3) and not being accessible. These reasons could motivate researchers to build their 
own up-to-date and labeled datasets.
4. Android malware application detection and ranking
Many previous works have considered the problem of ranking Android apps 
and classify them to either malware or benign apps. The majority of these solutions 
have relied mainly only on the permission model and what types of permissions are 
requested/used by the application. They used different ways and depth of analysis 
in this regard.
The work presented in [72] studied the permission occurrences in the market 
apps and the malware apps. Also, the authors analyzed the rules (a combination of 
permissions) defined in Kirin [73] in order to calculate the risk signals and to reduce 
the warning rates. Gates et al. in [74] have compared work presented in [72, 73], 
naïve-based algorithms and two proposed methods for risk scoring. These methods 
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consider the rarity of permissions as the primary indicator that contributes to rais-
ing a warning. The performance comparison was in terms of the detection rate.
The authors in [75] used similar hypotheses of listing the permissions in each 
app and count occurrences of permissions in similar apps (a game category in their 
case) excluding the user-defined permissions that are not affecting the privacy. In 
their solution, they gave the user the choice to turn off the permission(s). In [76], 
the authors used the combination of features (permissions) to compare the clean 
app values with the malware values to come up with thresholds that will be used to 
classify new Android apps. Within the same context, the idea presented in [77] was to 
construct a standard permission vector model for each category, which can be used as 
a baseline to measure and assess the risk of applications within the same category. For 
each downloaded app, the permission vector will be extracted and compared with the 
standard one; the amount of deviation from the baseline will calculate the app’s risk.
While discussing the approaches in the existing risk scoring systems and their 
main dependency on the Android permissions, it is worth asking how many of them 
have considered the involvement of the user with the scoring results and, if they 
decided to involve the user, how the risk was displayed and communicated to the 
user. The empirical study conducted in [78], which implemented an intensive study 
on top, used permissions with a high-risk level. They calculated the risk level based 
on the type of permissions and the probability they will be requested by the app. 
The risk value for each permission in addition to its technical name and description 
was transmitted to the users. Although a coloring code was used to indicate the level 
of risk, still users are involved in technical details which will not help them to take 
proper decisions regarding the apps’ installation. The work presented in [79] has 
utilized fuzzy logic to measure the risk score. Also, in addition to the permissions 
and their categories, they took input from different antivirus tools to calculate the 
score. Their system allowed the user to upload the app’s APK through the browser and 
provided them with a risk report. This report showed the risk score, permission usage 
rate, and unnecessary permission usage rate in addition to the list of permissions, 
their categories, and risk level. On the other hand, the authors in [80] have considered 
the statistical distribution of the Android permissions in addition to the probabilistic 
functions. The declared but not exploited permissions and vice versa were all consid-
ered in their risk analysis. Machine learning was also utilized to measure risk.
In terms of visualizing the permissions and their risks, the authors in [81] intro-
duced Papilio to visualize Android application permissions graphically. This helped 
them to find the relations among the applications and applications’ permissions as 
well. Papilio was able to find the permissions requested frequently by applications 
and permissions that either never requested or requested infrequently. The authors 
in [82] stressed the importance of visualizing the statistical information related to 
Android permissions. Having graphical representation for the permissions’ statics 
within a specific category encouraged the users to choose more often apps with a 
lower number of permissions. A privacy meter was used in [83] to visualize the 
permissions’ statistics through a slider bar which outperformed the existing warn-
ing system like Google’s permission screens. Visualizing app activities enhances 
user’s awareness and sensitivity to the privacy intrusiveness of mobile applications 
[84]. Another attempt to visualize the permissions statistics was also introduced in 
[85] using lifelog analysis views in terms of risk history and app’s risk view.
From the above-related work, we can observe that the majority of the previous 
solutions have mainly relied on permissions either statistically or based on prob-
ability to analyze Android apps, to classify them as malwares, and to measure their 
risk level. Although permissions are important to analyze and classify Android 
applications. However, these permissions should be up-to-date. Also, other impor-
tant static and dynamic metrics need to be considered to guarantee a comprehensive 
evaluation and consequently an accurate detection of malware apps.
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There have been many types of research on designing malicious detec-
tion approaches. Such approaches resort to static analysis of the malware, 
and others use dynamic analysis, while some methods utilize both static and 
dynamic analyses to get better detection of a malicious incident. Moreover, the 
generated datasets will be analyzed in order to detect any potential security 
threats, regardless whether these datasets were constructed based on static or 
dynamic tests or even both. Usually, data mining techniques could be used for 
the purpose of detecting and classifying attacks [42, 52]. Moreover, intelligence 
techniques could be utilized to even rank the risk by assigning the attack a risk 
score [42, 86].
The scanning service might fruit in developing a mobile application that is 
installed on user’s devices to examine the Android application and discriminate, 
if it is a clean app or a malicious app to warn the user and protect her/his Android 
device. DREBIN [87] is one of the malware detection systems available for smart-
phones. One of the major features that DREBIN provides is instantaneous malware 
detection. When a new application is downloaded, DREBIN starts the analyzing 
process directly. As a result, the user is protected against any unreliable sources. 
Another example of anti-malware software is HinDroid [88] which has been 
integrated as one of Comodo’s mobile security scanning tools. HinDroid structures 
the APIs based on heterogeneous information network in order to make predictions 
about the tested application. Consequently, HinDroid can reduce the time and cost 
of analyzing Android apps.
5. Statistical analysis
This section presents a statistical study to show the frequency of the used 
approaches, methods, datasets, and tools in the current systems. Various, related, 
recent, published solutions in 2017–2018 were considered in this study.
In regard to reverse engineering tools utilized by researchers, APKtool was heav-
ily used by 54% in comparison with other tools (see Figure 4). Soot was next with 
20% of usage.
Figure 4. 
Reverse engineering tool usage in 2017–2018 research.
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Figure 5 shows a comparison among the static tools which were utilized by research-
ers. It can be observed that 48% of the static-based systems used FlowDroid tool in their 
solutions. PScout was the second most used with percentage reaching around 28%.
Dynamic analysis tool usage is illustrated in Figure 6. The majority of existing 
solutions used Droidbox with 27% and TaintDroid with 24% in comparison with 
other approaches. The rest of the results are shown in Figure 6.
The results in Figure 7 reveal that AndroZoo was the most used dataset in 
2017–2018. The percentage of usage reached 43%. Genome and DREBIN datasets 
came next with frequencies 30 and 16%, respectively.
Figure 5. 
Static tool frequency in 2017–2018 research work.
Figure 6. 
Dynamic tool frequency in 2017–2018 research work.
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6. Conclusions
This chapter highlighted the booming of Android technologies and their appli-
cations which make them more attractive to security attackers. Recent statistics of 
Android malwares and their impact were presented. Additionally, this chapter has 
provided the main phases required to apply security scanning to Android applica-
tions. The purpose is to protect Android users and their devices from the threats of 
different security attacks. These phases include the way of downloading Android 
apps, decoding them to generate the source code, and how this code is screened to 
extract the required features to apply either static analysis or dynamic analysis or 
both. The feature extraction process resulted in constructing different datasets. 
Proper data analysis and data mining techniques could be applied to examine the 
app and classify it as benign or malware with high accuracy. The malware detection 
service could be implemented and provided in terms of a mobile application that 
will communicate the scanning results to the user in a friendly way. The chapter 
was concluded by presenting a statistical study that showed the most used tools and 
datasets throughout the scanning process for the last 2 years 2017 and 2018.
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